How do these groups fund their operations, recruit people, and acquire weapons? Are they supported by any local communities?
Héni: Fear, a lack of state presence, and grievances among marginalized communities in remote border areas enable ISSP’s survival. The group has multiple, diverse revenue streams in the Sahel, as previously mentioned. It acquires weapons through battlefield captures and cross-border smuggling, as well as local manufacturing of explosive devices. Recruitment is carried out through coercion; ideological indoctrination, including of children; and the exploitation of ethnic tensions and socio-economic grievances, particularly among marginalized communities. Despite ISSP’s strict rule enforcement and basic governance provision in the areas under its control, local support varies, ranging from passive compliance to active resistance.
Miriam: Similarly, ISWAP obtains its labor force largely through coercion, but economic factors also entice some recruits to the group due to promises of better standards of living as a fighter for the group. Its revenue consists of ransom payments and taxes imposed on civilian communities, including fishers around Lake Chad. While some of their weapons are from the Islamic State and other affiliate groups in the region, much of ISWAP’s arsenal comes from ransacked military bases, camps, convoys, and deserting soldiers. This trend has intensified in 2025, as ISWAP launched several sophisticated attacks on military bases in Nigeria’s Borno state.
Ladd: Originally a Ugandan rebel group, ISCAP still draws recruits from Uganda, but also from the DRC and across other areas of eastern Africa. ISCAP generates funds and resources by looting villages and relying on pillaged resources. Further, the group often abducts civilians for forced labor or marriage. Collectively, the decimation of villages and use of rural camps show ISCAP’s lack of interest in governing many of the areas where the group operates. While most weapons are acquired locally through arms trafficking or clashes with militias and state forces, ISCAP militants have also learned bomb-making skills from Islamic State trainers operating across eastern and southern Africa.
Mohamed: As I mentioned in the previous question, IS Somalia sustains its operations primarily through extortion and illicit taxation of businesses. In Bosaso, the group reportedly demanded up to $500,000 from local businesses in 2023. The city’s strategic coastal positioning also allows access to arms trafficking networks operating between Yemen and Somalia, with militants using existing weapons smuggling networks that operate across several coastal regions in Somalia. IS Somalia recruits defectors from al-Shabaab and enjoys support from local communities, including the prominent sub-clans of the Majeerteen clan, especially the Ali Saleban sub-clan in the Bari region, which the group’s leader, Abdulkadir Mumin, is from.
Peter: Armaments are mostly seized in operations against the Mozambican military. In 2022, ISM started to produce and deploy IEDs. Technical assistance is thought to have come from the DRC, where ISCAP’s IED use increased noticeably in 2021. Recruits come from northern Mozambique, Tanzania, and other countries in the Great Lakes, particularly the DRC — reflecting connections with ISCAP — while some are abducted into the group, including children. Networks in towns and cities in the north support supply and financing networks that supplement ISM’s looting and ransom activities. ISM actively seeks support in some coastal and nearby areas that are predominantly Muslim, and where some leaders originate, but this is tempered by its intimidation, looting, and extortion of these same communities.
What is the current relationship between these local Islamic State affiliates and the IS global network?
Héni: Ties to IS Central remained tenuous for years after the group first pledged allegiance without official recognition in 2015. However, IS Central formally integrated ISSP, then known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, into ISWAP in March 2019 as a separate subgroup. ISWAP operatives were deployed to oversee and support ISSP’s growth, while regional affiliates in Libya and Nigeria facilitated propaganda, strategic guidance, and financial support. Since gaining status as an IS province in March 2022, ISSP has remained largely self-sustaining while being fully embedded within the Islamic State’s global structure and media ecosystem.
Miriam: Since it emerged from a split with the previously IS-aligned Boko Haram in 2016, ISWAP has been the official IS affiliate in the Lake Chad basin. Propaganda showcasing ISWAP’s activities is often published by the Islamic State’s media. Evolutions in ISWAP activity in recent years, though, point to collaboration in terms of training with its global network. In particular, the resurgence of IED attacks in 2024 indicates that training was provided to the group to replace lost fighters. ISWAP has also modified its strategy by using drones to carry out attacks, likely as part of a technological transfer by the global IS network to other localized branches like ISWAP.
Ladd: Musa Baluku, a Ugandan and former imam who joined the group in 1994 before becoming the current leader of ISCAP in 2015, steered the group toward IS affiliation. By 2020, the ADF formally rebranded as ISCAP. Previous leadership had long resisted integration with IS, but evidence of a connection with IS slowly emerged under Baluku’s leadership as the group increasingly drew on foreign fighters or trainers to increase capacity and move finances. IS Central has more frequently published propaganda about ISCAP operations over the past year — often within days of attacks — signaling closer coordination and stronger integration into IS’s global messaging infrastructure.
Mohamed: There is a strong relationship between IS Somalia and IS Central. Not only does IS Central view Somalia as a burgeoning operational area for its global operations due to its strategic location and the weakness of the Somali government, but IS Somalia also hosts IS’s regional coordination hub: the al-Karrar office. IS Somalia is one of IS’s most profitable branches and, as such, serves as the financial hub for the wider IS network in Africa and beyond. Its importance extends far beyond the region, though. Even if Mumin, IS Somalia’s leader, is not the head of IS Central as some reports have suggested, he is widely acknowledged to be one of IS’s most senior leaders globally.
Peter: ISM draws heavily on support from regional IS affiliates. It has documented ties with ISCAP in the DRC — the source of its IED manufacturing capacity — and IS support networks in South Africa and Somalia. Islamist networks in Tanzania are also a source of support in accessing finance and moving people. ISM has received funding through the al-Karrar office in the past and has strong and ongoing relations with IS media operations, as reflected in regular reporting in their outlets through a consistent IS style.
Given the threat to governance, economies, and civilians, how are local governments responding?
Héni: Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have responded to the ISSP threat primarily through military and security operations, both unilaterally and through occasional regional coordination. Mali has also received support from Russian partners, initially through the Wagner Group and more recently the Africa Corps. Where state presence is limited, authorities rely heavily on militias and self-defense groups. These include Burkina Faso’s state-backed Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) and community-based self-defense groups in Mali and Niger, but these forces have struggled to contain and resist ISSP. The main bulwark against ISSP’s expansion, however, has been its al-Qaeda-affiliated rival Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin. These groups fought intensely between 2020 and 2023, but both seem to be prioritizing fighting state forces and militias since.
Miriam: The spread of the group across the Lake Chad region led to the birth of the MNJTF, whose troops came from Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Chad, and Cameroon. Recent coups and internal political tussles in Niger and Chad have threatened the stability of the MNJTF, leading to a lack of coordination among member countries and the withdrawal of Niger’s troops from the task force in 2025. Chad also threatened to withdraw its troops and support in 2024. Independently, the Nigerian military carries out special military exercises in the region and has gradually evolved into training and deploying designated units for this sole purpose. The French military provided some support to the MNJTF until 2023, when it exited Niger.
Ladd: The Congolese military deals with ISCAP through security partnerships with Uganda and local militias. It launched joint operations with the Ugandan army in 2021 to counter ISCAP’s growing threat. However, local militias and Ugandan forces have taken a more prominent role in confronting ISCAP in more recent years, as the Congolese army struggles to sustain pressure on multiple fronts, exacerbated by the recent resurgence of the March 23 Movement rebellion. Joint Ugandan-Congolese operations have pushed the militants westward since 2024. Notably, on 10 July 2025, Ugandan forces claimed that they captured ISCAP’s largest camp in Apakwang, Ituri Province, commonly called Madina.
Mohamed: The Puntland administration’s security forces have maintained an ongoing operation targeting IS Somalia stronghold positions in the Cali Miskat mountain range in the Bari region since December 2024. There, security forces have gained control over several IS stronghold villages, destroyed hideouts, and killed and captured senior IS members. The United Arab Emirates and United States support these operations through both military aid and airstrikes.
Peter: Mozambique currently relies on troops from Rwanda and Tanzania to support its counter-insurgency efforts against ISM. Of the two, Rwanda is the most important, as it has over 4,000 troops deployed across the north of the province, but concentrated around the TotalEnergies natural gas project. A two-and-a-half-year military intervention by the Southern African Development Community ended in 2024, with Mozambique preferring bilateral arrangements over complex multilateral support.
Source link
#Islamic #States #pivot #Africa