Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update, August 25, 2025

Andrew Raynus, Zachary Yacht, Sofia Walsh, Tetiana Trach, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros

August 23, 2025, 10 am ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on August 20, 2025. This report focuses on technological adaptations and the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and excludes reports on Russian force generation efforts. ISW will cover Russian force generation efforts in the upcoming Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update.

Russian developers continue to introduce and test new kinetic anti-drone measures such as drone interceptors, thermal imaging sighting systems, and lasers. A Russian milblogger who focuses on Russian unmanned systems developments published footage on August 14, claiming that the optical-electronic module on Russia’s Yolka drone interceptor is artificial intelligence (AI) synchronized and can detect a 100-centimeter drone wingspan up to 700–1000 meters away, and advocated that such systems be deployed to defend Russian surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems.[1] Another Russian milblogger posted footage on July 29 of a Russian Yolka drone interceptor downing a Ukrainian Baba Yaga drone and claimed that Russia has been using these interceptors since at least May 2025.[2] The Yolka interceptor launches by catapult and operates on a fire-and-forget model due to its AI-based homing capability. The interceptor reportedly has no explosive warhead and simply intercepts targets with a kinetic strike. The milblogger claimed that Russia will attempt to adapt interceptor drones to intercept long-range Ukrainian drones. A different Russian milblogger posted footage on August 10 showing a new Russian drone that fires a shotgun-like combat load to destroy Ukrainian Mavic and Baba Yaga drones.[3] Russian firms presented a variety of interceptor drones at the ”Archipelago 2025” exhibition, which was part of Russia’s larger Unmanned Systems Technologies of the Future forum.[4] One displaced interceptor, the Skvorets PVO, has an AI-based target capture and active interception system and claims to be able to intercept targets at a maximum speed of 270 kilometers per hour.[5] The Bolt interceptor drone and radar system can receive target designations from external radars.[6] 

The Kinzhal interceptor drone (not to be confused with the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile) claims to be capable of independently striking targets, capable of being integrated into an autonomous drone detection system, and able to fly at a maximum speed of 300 kilometers per hour.[7] The Ovod PVO system reportedly can intercept drones using a kinetic strike or an integrated warhead.[8] The Ovod system can also be controlled manually or with an onboard guidance system.[9] The Krestnik M maritime interceptor drone can combat moving surface targets by launching from air, land, and sea platforms.[10] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the Russian Central Bank also presented its “Digital Patrol” acoustic sensor network that can detect, classify, locate, and predict the flight paths of drones at the forum.[11] TASS also reported on August 10 that Russia‘s Kalashnikov weapons enterprise displayed the Granat-4 drone, which uses a laser target designation system to collect targeting information and provides automatic target tracking from 100 meters to 12 kilometers.[12]

A Russian milblogger claimed on August 16 that Russia’s Black Sea Fleet tested the KRECHET thermal imaging sighting system, which allows an operator to fire the Soviet 7.62 GShG aircraft machine gun at 6,000 rounds per minute accurately at high-speed air and surface targets while maintaining spatial orientation.[13] The milblogger said that Russia does not currently produce the Soviet-era machine gun necessary for the system, necessitating Russia to resume production of a Soviet equivalent of a Gatling machine gun and turrets.[14] The milblogger said the machine gun demonstrated high efficiency during tests and that the machine gun should reenter production with modernized features to increase combat effectiveness.[15]

Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported on July 28 that Russian defense company KPB Polet introduced the second version of its hand-held Spider anti-drone netting system that allows a shooter to defend against small drones.[16] The updated anti-drone small arm has a reinforced metal core, upgraded projectiles, and fires an expanding net payload that expands to cover 30 meters. Russian soldiers are testing a trial batch of the Spider system in occupied Ukraine. Russian war correspondent Valentin Trushny claimed on August 18 that the Spider net launcher is still underdeveloped and ineffective as an anti-drone weapon due to a complex reloading process, limitations of the nets’ weights, and the power of the cartridge propelling the net.[17]

Key Takeaways:

Russian Technological Adaptations

• Russian developers continue to introduce and test new kinetic anti-drone measures such as drone interceptors, thermal imaging sighting systems, and lasers.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces are racing to create “smart minefields” by developing complex mining systems.
• Russia is reportedly collaborating with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to develop an automated command and control (C2) system for amphibious operations.
• The Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly developed new unmanned surface vehicles (USVs).

Russian Unmanned Systems Tactics

• Russian forces are reportedly conducting an echeloned deployment of first-person view (FPV) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) interceptor systems in Ukraine, which may be enabling Russian advances.
• Russia reportedly established the first drone control center in Kamchatka Peninsula.

Russian Defense Industrial Base

• Russian recruiters are continuing to recruit Russian and Central Asian children and teenagers to construct the Alabuga factory and produce drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ).
• The Kremlin officially extended tax benefits for some Russian drone manufacturers to incentivize Russian development and production of tactical drones.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Assessed Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian and Ukrainian forces are racing to create “smart minefields” by developing complex mining systems. Ukrainian weapon and military technology expert Bohdan Dolintse told Ukrainian military news agency ArmyInform on August 16 that smart minefields implement a new generation of mines that autonomously change their characteristics after installation to adapt to the operational environment, location, and mission requirements. Dolintse noted that mines can choose a different response model based on what threat enters their sector and can migrate across the battlefield within defined patrol zones by leveraging sensors and gauges to determine obstacles. Smart mines use the same power supply elements as sleep drones, such as small solar panels, and use acoustic and optical devices that gather intelligence on the environment. Dolintse emphasized that smart minefields are still in early development stages and that most minefields in Ukraine still use traditional mining technologies. Dolintse noted that innovations in mining technology will enable precise targeting. Dolintse noted that minefields are becoming more advanced and complex as they allow Ukrainian or Russian forces to conduct ambushes at the most opportune moments. Dolintse noted that neither Ukraine nor Russia has deployed smart mines at scale due to development and production limitations.

Russian developers are trying to modify tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to carry new warheads. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 17 that the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center reported that their Center for Unmanned Systems is testing various newly adapted munitions tailored for specific tactical tasks.[18] BARS-Sarmat drone operators are reportedly training to strike targets using drone-delivered payloads that weigh up to seven kilograms, delivered by various drones such as the Moliya-2. The milblogger claimed that BARS-Sarmat is testing the new KZ-7 engineering charge. Russian milblogger Alexander Sladkov reported on August 15 that new Russian hexacopters can transport 80 to 200 kilograms, and some units are using such hexacopters to evacuate wounded soldiers.[19]

Russian developers recently modified Gerbera decoy and reconnaissance UAVs to carry warheads.

Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service reported on August 5 that Russian forces are increasingly equipping Gerbera UAVs with warheads, a break from their previous use of the Gerbera drones primarily as reconnaissance or decoy drones.[20]

Russian developers continue to field UAVs with alternative navigation systems, machine vision, and artificial intelligence. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhii “Flash” Beskrtenov posted images of Russia’s V2U drone and stated that there is a new V2U that uses AI to conduct reconnaissance.[21] This variant differs from the existing strike version.[22] The V2U now has a strike version, a reconnaissance version, and a logistical courier version.[23] The drone’s developer and manufacturer are unknown, and it reportedly uses no Russian components.[24] Flash stated that this drone line, developed with AI, is the most innovative and dangerous Russian drone.[25] Flash reported on August 15 that Russian forces have been using land navigation in the V2U drone for a year and that Ukrainian drones must similarly develop drones that can operate in GPS-denied areas.[26]

Russia is reportedly collaborating with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to develop an automated command and control (C2) system for amphibious operations. The BlackMoon hacker group posted leaked documents on August 18 indicating that Russia is collaborating with China to create an automated C2 system for amphibious operations under the codename of “Sword.”[27] The leaked documents claim that Russian state corporation Rosoboronexport signed a contract with the Chinese CETC International Corporation in June 2024 to supply technological documentation for the development of the C2 system. This system includes software and hardware systems for command and staff vehicles, communication devices, field command posts, amphibious assault vehicles, and wearable devices that ensure secure data transmission and coordination at tactical and operational levels. The leaked documents claim that commanders will manage this system at the corps-, brigade-, company-, platoon-, squad-, and individual level and implement mobile data transmission systems. The documents claim that Russia will deliver C2 hardware to China to integrate it into China’s domestically produced military vehicles. The BlackMoon reported that Russia completed two stages of research and development and that the third stage, involving the production of prototype samples and practical testing, is underway. The document leak also claims that Russia is training 60 representatives of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including training on radios at a Tulatotchmash facility in Tula Oblast, Russia. ISW is unable to verify the veracity of the document or BlackMoon’s report.

A Russian-Chinese company reportedly developed a new fiber optic cable reinforced with Kevlar to ensure that Russian fiber optic UAVs and other unmanned vehicles can operate in difficult terrain. The Chinese-Russian PGI Technology company reportedly began combining Kevlar thread with optical fiber to increase the cable’s strength and ability to survive breakage caused by high speed maneuvers.[28] A social media source posted a video on August 5 purportedly of a five-kilometer spool of the newly-produced fiber optic cable, which reportedly can be used in fiber optic drones, unmanned ground vehicles, and field communication lines.[29]

The Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly developed new unmanned surface vehicles (USVs). Beskrtenov reported on August 2 that Rubikon designed USVs to strike Ukraine’s maritime infrastructure.[30] Available photos and videos of the new naval drones suggest that operators are training to strike maritime targets with surface-based suicide drones and are testing at least one model with underwater capabilities, possibly indicating that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is pursuing hybrid designs to better avoid detection and interception.[31] Russian state media outlet Izvestiya reported on the creation of these units in May 2025, claiming that the Russian Navy is creating unmanned regiments that include aerial drones, USVs, and underwater unmanned vehicles (UUVs) to provide combined capabilities on land, air, and sea, and to perform reconnaissance, surveillance, and anti-submarine defense.[32] Rubikon’s is also using Zala, Lancet, and Z-16 UAVs to counter Ukrainian USVs.[33]

Russian developers continued to introduce new unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) capable of launching drones and providing logistics support. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on August 2, which reportedly shows elements of the Russian repair and restoration battalion of the 20th Combined Arms Army ([CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) conducting UGV exercises. The Russian MoD claimed that the battalion fielded a newly developed radio-controlled UGV that can transport 150 kilograms at a maximum speed of 25 kilometers per hour.[34] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian developers designed the UGV to operate in conditions where covert movement is limited and that the UGV can evacuate wounded Russian servicemen and deliver supplies. The Russian Volunteer Corps published footage on August 1 showing drone developers of the Tekhnologia detachment testing a Russian UGV concept, which appears to have an attached propeller-less FPV drone for communication and video feed.[35] The Russian Korney company is developing a ground robotic drone carrier known as the Dronobus, which contains a transporter and launcher for wire-guided FPV drones. The Dronobus system is reportedly able to carry up to 150 kilograms and has fiber optic cables that can connect to other ground-based systems with a range up to 10 kilometers and to fiber optic FPV drones up to 15 kilometers.[36]

Russian developers reportedly integrated cameras into Russian Shahed (Geran) strike UAVs and are fielding these UAVs in Ukraine. Beskrestnov posted footage on August 18 of Shahed debris and noted that several Shaheds had integrated video cameras.[37] Beskrestnov reported that Ukrainian forces previously found dozens of video cameras on Gerbera reconnaissance and decoy UAVs. Beskrestnov implied that previous Shahed modifications did not have integrated video cameras and assessed that Russian forces are likely trying to record Shahed’s path up until the moment of impact.

Russian forces are reportedly using newly developed small cruise missiles to target Ukraine’s deep rear. A Ukrainian social media account shared footage on August 10 reportedly showing a new Russian small cruise missile, which has a turbojet engine that allows the missile to travel significant distances.[38] The social media account noted that Ukrainian forces do not know the name of the missile and that the missile looks like a small Storm Shadow cruise missile.[39] The social media account observed that the new Russian missile conceptually resembles the Ukrainian Peklo missile.

Russian Unmanned Systems Tactics (Assessed Russian objective: Achieve battlefield air interdiction effects and other battlefield advantages with unmanned systems).

Russian sources commented on how the terrain in Ukraine is affecting Russian forces’ ability to support offensive operations with UAVs and how innovations in drone use are increasingly threatening Russian efforts to envelop Ukrainian forces in western Donetsk Oblast. A former Russian Storm-Z instructor and milblogger amplified a comment on August 15 that heights allow Russian forces to strike Ukrainian forces with UAVs without aerial repeaters and that launching UAVs from heights simplifies reconnaissance operations.[40] The commenter noted that Russian forces have a more challenging time launching drone strikes from lowlands and that only UAVs with repeaters can fly close enough to strike targets on the lowlands. The commenter assessed that it is more advantageous for Russian assault elements to operate in the lowlands while receiving drone support from elements operating on dominant heights. The commenter stated that Russian forces cannot always use this tactic on the battlefield due to Ukrainian forces mining entrances to the dominant heights, forcing Russian personnel to bypass the heights to interdict Ukrainian ground line of communications (GLOCs). The commenter observed that Russian forces’ main goal in an envelopment is expanding flanks to increase logistics capacity because drones cannot supply a large force or evacuate wounded. The milblogger largely agreed with the commenter’s observations and added that both Russian and Ukrainian forces increasingly face the risks of being cut off from salients by drone strikes and other means of remote destruction.

Russian forces are reportedly conducting an echeloned deployment of first-person view (FPV) UAV interceptor systems in Ukraine, which may be enabling Russian advances. A Ukrainian servicemember reported on August 17 that rapid Russian advances on the battlefield coincided with Russian deployment of echeloned FPV drone interceptor systems.[41] The servicemember noted that Russian forces have mastered the echeloned deployment of FPV drone interceptor systems are currently adopting this tactic at scale. The servicemember stated that Russia’s echeloned deployment of FPV interceptors creates no-fly zones that prevent Ukrainian forces from using counter-UAV systems and detecting Russian manpower concentrations early. The servicemember argued that Ukrainian forces need to embrace systemic changes in conducting aerial reconnaissance in the wake of increased deployment of interceptor systems. The servicemember warned that Russian interceptors can degrade the quality and quantity of Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance.

The Kremlin is introducing measures to surveil and centralize control over Russian civilian UAV usage via the Russian ERA-GLONASS information system. Moscow-based business newspaper Vedomosti, citing a proposal from the Russian Ministry of Transport, reported on August 11 that the Russian government is preparing to transmit Russian civilian drone flight routes to regulatory authorities via the ERA-GLONASS state information system starting from March 1, 2026.[42] The proposal specified that all UAVs must be equipped with identification trackers that connect to ERA-GLONASS, and all previously released drones must obtain these trackers by March 1, 2026. The proposal stated that such measures will ensure transparency in UAV use, create a joint UAV identification database, and ease bans on drone flights in Russian oblasts. The ERA-GLONASS representative told Vedomosti that GLONASS will transmit UAV flight data for free to Russian federal agencies and ministries, oblasts, emergency response services, organizations performing tasks against illegal drone use, and educational and training institutions. ISW assessed in February 2025 that the Kremlin launched ERA-GLONASS in hopes of using the system to force civilian drones to land instead of expending anti-aircraft systems to shoot them down.[43]

Russia reportedly established the first drone control center in Kamchatka Peninsula. Russian state newspaper Izvestia reported on August 7, per sources in the Russian MoD, that the Russian Navy deployed its first drone control center in Kamchatka Peninsula and plans to construct additional special deployment sites in Kamchatka for long-range drones. Russian MoD sources stated that the Russian Navy will monitor the situation in the Arctic region with Forpost and Orion (also known as Inokhodets) UAVs.[44] Russian military experts told Izvestia that the center’s deployment will allow the Russian Navy to conduct patrols of the sea, airspace, and northern territories. Russian military experts also claimed that the drone center will allow the Russian Navy to monitor US military presence in the Pacific Ocean and the Bering Strait and defend the Russian nuclear submarine base in Kamchatka. A Russian milblogger affiliated with Russian Spetsnaz commented that Inokhodets and Forpost UAVs have limited operational range, but that Russian forces can modernize these UAVs and integrate AI to extend the range. The milblogger welcomed the deployment of the drone control center and implied that such deployment would compensate for Russia’s lack of anti-submarine aircraft.[45] An Estonian OSINT analyst amplified satellite images on August 8 showing that Russia installed anti-drone nets at the Rybachy nuclear submarine base of the Pacific Fleet in Kamchatka.[46]

Russian Defense Industrial Base (Assessed Russian objective: Increase Russia’s defense industrial base production to support Russian war efforts)

The Kremlin is continuing to expand the drone factory and supporting infrastructure at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to increase Russian Shahed drone production. CNN reported on July 25 that satellite imagery shows that Russia has been increasingly constructing new infrastructure at the Alabuga Drone Factory in the Republic of Tatarstan since August 2024.[47] Satellite imagery indicates that the Kremlin has constructed at least eight new warehouse-like structures near Shahed drone manufacturing facilities between late 2024 and July 2025, and at least 104 structures resembling partially or fully constructed worker dormitories between February and July 12, 2025. US-based experts shared estimates with CNN that new dormitories can potentially accommodate up to 40,000 workers when finished.[48]

Russian recruiters are continuing to recruit Russian and Central Asian children and teenagers to construct the Alabuga factory and produce drones at the Alabuga SEZ. CNN reported that Russia opened the Alabuga Build summer camp on July 4 and that the Russian Student Brigades youth organization organized the camp.[49] The Republic of Tatarstan’s Education Ministry claimed that Russian Student Brigades drafted about 2,500 students to build the Mediterranean Park housing complex at Alabuga, and CNN observed over 100 tents appear next to drone production warehouses like the ones seen in Alabuga Build promotional material. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty‘s Tatar-Bashkir Service Idel Realii reported on August 15 that Russian authorities are also recruiting Central Asian youth for work at Alabuga under deceptive promises that teenagers will receive education at the Alabuga Polytech College, located at the Alabuga SEZ.[50] Idel Realii reported that Russian recruiters are actively advertising schooling at the Alabuga Polytech College in Kyrgyz schools and colleges. ISW previously reported on Russia’s increasing efforts to involve children and teenagers in drone design and production, both at Alabuga and via networks of student clubs and training programs.[51]

Russia is reportedly expanding its drone production in Rostov Oblast. Rostov Oblast Acting Governor Yuriy Slyusar stated during a meeting with Putin on August 18 that Rostov Oblast is actively expanding its drone production, including production of dual-use drones.[52] Slyusar stated in an interview after the meeting with Putin that Rostov Oblast drone manufacturers produce up to 100,000 drones per month, partly due to the support of Russia’s Unmanned Aerial Systems program.[53]

A Russian source claimed that Russia’s primary tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod produced between 540 and 630 T-90M tanks since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 31 that Russia’s primary tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) began mass producing modernized T-90M Proryv main battle tanks since the beginning of 2022.[54] Russian forces had approximately 65 to 85 T-90M tanks and 370 to 380 older T-90 and T-90A tanks in service as of February 2022. The milblogger claimed that UVZ’s annual production volume increased from 60 to 70 T-90M tanks in 2022 to 140 to 180 tanks in 2023 to possibly 250 to 300 tanks in 2024. The milblogger claimed that UVZ produced a total of 540 to 630 T-90Ms tanks since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and that this total includes newly constructed tanks and modernized T-90A tanks. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces only sustained 130 confirmed T-90 tank losses and assessed that between 410 to 500 T-90Ms remain in service. Dutch open-source project Oryx visually confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured, damaged, or destroyed 140 T-90M, one T-90AK, 11 T-90S, and 45 T-90A tanks as of August 1, 2025.[55] The milblogger added that UVZ is preparing to expand production by establishing new welding stations and machines designed for nonstop operation, which can support higher production volumes in the coming years, but noted that increasing tank production requires additional investment and modern equipment.[56] [57] Ukrainian officials previously assessed that UVZ can only produce roughly 60 to 70 T-90 tanks per year under perfect conditions, and UVZ is likely producing between three and six T-90 tanks per month.[58]

Russia is facing procurement problems with Su-57 fighter aircraft due to Western sanctions. First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Lieutenant General Alexander Maksimtsev claimed on August 1 that the Russian DIB is increasing the deliveries of Su-57 aircraft with hypersonic weapons to Russian forces.[59] Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight published an investigation on August 16, citing documents obtained from the Ukrainian Dallas analytics team, that revealed that the Russian MoD has been having problems with Su-57 procurement since 2021 and 2022. The documents indicated that the Russian Sukhoi aircraft manufacturer delivered the Su-57 jets without targeting pods and electro-optical targeting subsystems, which undermined their operational capabilities.[60] Frontelligence Insight reported in September 2024 that Western sanctions also impeded Russian Mikropribor military electronics manufacturer from producing critical microchips for Su-57 aircraft, resulting in disrupted procurement contracts and delayed production.[61] Frontelligence Insight observed that companies within the Sukhoi corporation have also inflated pricing and engaged in corruption schemes. Frontelligence Insight assessed that a combination of Western sanctions and Russian corruption resulted in the Russian MoD receiving Su-57s with reduced combat effectiveness due to a lack of necessary electronic components.

Russian artillerymen are reportedly receiving poor quality Russian and North Korean artillery ammunition. A Russian milblogger amplified a complaint from a Russian artilleryman in an infantry regiment on July 29, which stated that Russian forces receive North Korean ammunition that lacks precision and is unreliable in combat. The artilleryman noted that Russian forces at first used Soviet ammunition, which worked well, but later switched to Iranian, North Korean, and recently made Russian ammunition. The serviceman noted that Iranian ammunition is precise and well-made, whereas recently made Russian ammunition is inconsistent, poorly produced, and lacks necessary quality control.[62] The milblogger claimed that Russian ammunition is off by 1-2 kilometers from the target and that Russian manufacturers do not provide manuals with usage recommendations for individual ammunition shipments. The artilleryman also complained that Russian commanders transfer artillerymen operating this inferior ammunition to assault units as punishment for poor combat performance. The milblogger attempted to excuse the poor condition of the Russian ammunition by noting that Russian forces need ammunition urgently and in large quantities, resulting in the Russian DIB needing to take shortcuts.[63] The milblogger recalled that Russian shell manufacturers delivered unpainted shells in 2022 and argued that modern Russian ammunition cannot be compared to Soviet ammunition because the Soviet Union produced limited batches of shells.

The Kremlin officially extended tax benefits for some Russian drone manufacturers to incentivize Russian development and production of tactical drones. Putin signed a bill on July 31 that establishes a zero value-added tax (VAT) rate for producers that sell drones weighing from 0.15 to 30 kilograms.[64] The bill also established a zero VAT rate for imported engines, spare parts and components for drone assembly, repair, and modernization. Russian State Duma Deputy from occupied Crimea Mikhail Sheremet stated that the law aims to reduce drone production costs, support small business, and maintain Russian technological advantages in the drone industry.[65] The Russian State Duma originally adopted the bill on July 17.[66]

[1] https://x.com/sambendett/status/1956424585605480641; https://t.me/uav_tech/33289

[2] https://t.me/rybar/72492

[3] https://t.me/vestnik247/12440 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956644673805488134

[4] https://t.me/milinfolive/154383; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-company-presents-line-of-interceptor-drones/; https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1954019325364576307

[5] https://t.me/milinfolive/154383; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-company-presents-line-of-interceptor-drones/; https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1954019325364576307 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24733623

[6] https://t.me/milinfolive/154383; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-company-presents-line-of-interceptor-drones/; https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1954019325364576307 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24733623

[7] https://t.me/milinfolive/154383; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-company-presents-line-of-interceptor-drones/; https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1954019325364576307 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24733623

[8] https://t.me/milinfolive/154383; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-company-presents-line-of-interceptor-drones/; https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1954019325364576307 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24733623

[9] https://t.me/milinfolive/154383; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-company-presents-line-of-interceptor-drones/; https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1954019325364576307 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24733623

[10] https://t.me/milinfolive/154383; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-company-presents-line-of-interceptor-drones/; https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1954019325364576307

[11] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24733623

[12] https://t.me/tass_agency/330285

[13] https://t.me/rusich_army/25237

[14] https://t.me/rusich_army/25237

[15] https://t.me/rusich_army/25237

[16] https://t.me/ramzayiegokomanda/28107; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-introduces-spider-hand-held-anti-drone-netting/

[17] https://t.me/trueshniy/1066

[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/77653

[19] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13848

[20] https://dpsu.gov dot ua/uk/news/47992-rosijskij-bezpilotnik-gerbera-staye-nebezpechnishim

[21] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6082 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956263087591374921; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176003; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02cqt6YXrKkoT8iZLmc3nDNAYPxjTKTTWzAXDEmDNPoYEE7q6nfdrsDcSajPxStSeFl

[22] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6082 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956263087591374921; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176003; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02cqt6YXrKkoT8iZLmc3nDNAYPxjTKTTWzAXDEmDNPoYEE7q6nfdrsDcSajPxStSeFl

[23] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6082 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956263087591374921; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176003; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02cqt6YXrKkoT8iZLmc3nDNAYPxjTKTTWzAXDEmDNPoYEE7q6nfdrsDcSajPxStSeFl

[24] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6082 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956263087591374921; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176003; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02cqt6YXrKkoT8iZLmc3nDNAYPxjTKTTWzAXDEmDNPoYEE7q6nfdrsDcSajPxStSeFl

[25] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6082 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956263087591374921; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176003; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02cqt6YXrKkoT8iZLmc3nDNAYPxjTKTTWzAXDEmDNPoYEE7q6nfdrsDcSajPxStSeFl

[26] https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02JFsNKEW5fA3ahmhB35uxFYp9E4vEcocCrbhyXQJ8TNA6p4c4pQuB6ySGDNcQthPNl ; https://t.me/serhii_flash/6087

[27] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-developing-command-system-for-china-s-amphibious-operations-against-taiwan/; https://x.com/blackmoon_group/status/1950107050270478380

[28] https://x.com/GrandpaRoy2/status/1952809125324431696 ; https://united24media dot com/latest-news/china-russia-joint-venture-develops-new-kevlar-fiber-optics-to-power-military-drones-10536; https://t.me/notes_veterans/24544

[29] https://x.com/GrandpaRoy2/status/1952809125324431696; https://t.me/notes_veterans/24544

[30] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6004

[31] https://united24media dot com/latest-news/inside-rubikon-elite-russian-drone-unit-trains-suicide-vessels-for-future-naval-attacks-10419

[32] https://en.iz dot ru/en/1884980/roman-krecul-bogdan-stepovoi/there-will-be-regiment-navy-creating-marine-parts-unmanned-systems

[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174577

[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/55217

[35] https://x.com/sambendett/status/1951372746363117858 ; https://t.me/DobroKor/1815

[36] https://t.me/milinfolive/154318;https://t.co/Ho72KcgWUR;https://x.com/sambendett/status/1953811072986562920;

[37] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6100

[38] https://t.me/war_home/4927; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-fires-new-small-cruise-missile-at-ukraine/

[39] https://t.me/war_home/4927; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-fires-new-small-cruise-missile-at-ukraine/

[40] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2954

[41] https://x.com/zajobanyiroman/status/1957162405005521386

[42] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/technology/articles/2025/08/11/1130629-informatsiyu-o-poletah-grazhdanskih-dronov-peredadut-cherez-era-glonass ; https://meduza.io/news/2025/08/11/vedomosti-v-rossii-vse-grazhdanskie-bespilotniki-budut-obyazany-peredavat-dannye-o-svoem-peremeschenii

[43] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2025

[44] https://en dot iz dot ru/en/1932476/bogdan-stepovoi-roman-krecul/kamchatka-game-navy-has-deployed-first-drone-control-center ;https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/57943

[45] https://t.me/rusich_army/25136

[46] https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1953717420645839108

[47] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/25/europe/russia-secretive-drone-factory-rapid-expansion-intl

[48] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/25/europe/russia-secretive-drone-factory-rapid-expansion-intl

[49] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/25/europe/russia-secretive-drone-factory-rapid-expansion-intl

[50] https://t.me/idelrealii/42235

[51] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-july-25-2025

[52] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77806

[53] https://news-don dot ru/society/2025/08/18/35569.html

[54] https://t.me/milinfolive/153897

[55] https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html

[56] https://t.me/milinfolive/153897

[57] https://t.me/milinfolive/153897

[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2024

[59] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1039129

[60] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1956760359953412586

[61] https://frontelligence dot substack.com/p/missing-targeting-pods-inflated-bills

[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/76355

[63] https://t.me/dva_majors/76356  

[64] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24679957; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202507310043?index=5

[65] https://t.me/sheremet_82/15959;

[66] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-july-25-2025